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Abstract
Mortgages are long-term loans with nominal payments. Consequently, under incomplete
asset markets, monetary policy can affect housing investment and the economy through the
cost of new mortgage borrowing and real payments on outstanding debt. These channels, dis-
tinct from traditional real rate channels, are embedded in a general equilibrium model. The
transmission mechanism is found to be stronger under adjustable- than fixed-rate mortgages.
Further, monetary policy shocks affecting the level of the nominal yield curve have larger
real effects than transitory shocks, affecting its slope. Persistently higher inflation gradually
benefits homeowners under FRMs, but hurts them immediately under ARMs. (JEL E32,
E52, G21, R21)
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Introduction
Mortgages are long-term loans with regular nominal payments, consisting of interest and
amortization. The payments are set up so as to guarantee that, given the mortgage interest
rate, the principal is gradually repaid in full by the end of the mortgage term, typically 15
to 30 years. A fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) has a fixed nominal interest rate and constant
nominal payments, set at origination, for the entire term of the loan; an adjustable-rate
mortgage (ARM), in contrast, sets nominal payments on a period-by-period basis so as,
given the current short-term nominal interest rate, the loan is expected to be repaid in full
during its remaining term. Various mortgage loans build on these two basic contracts and
in most countries, typically, one or the other type dominates.1
While the long-term nominal aspect of mortgages—a form of nominal rigidity—has been
studied in the household finance literature (e.g., Campbell and Cocco, 2003), a formal anal-
ysis of its consequences at the aggregate level has been missing (see Campbell, 2013). This
is despite the fact that mortgages, in the minds of policy makers, constitute an integral part
of a monetary transmission mechanism (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Bernanke, 2007;
Mishkin, 2007).
In major economies, already the size of mortgage finance would suggest that its role in the
monetary transmission mechanism must be important. Mortgage payments are equivalent to
15-22% of homeowners’ pre-tax income in the U.S. (average for the past 30-40 years); 15-20%
in the U.K. (Hancock and Wood, 2004); 27% in Germany (European Mortgage Federation,
2012b); 36.5% in Denmark (first-time homeowners; European Mortgage Federation, 2012c);
and 30% in France (first-time homeowners; European Mortgage Federation, 2009). And the
1Countries in which FRMs—with interest rates fixed for at least 10 years—have traditionally dom-
inated the mortgage market include Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, and the United States; in
most other countries, either ARMs or FRMs with interest rates fixed for less than 5 years prevail; see
Scanlon and Whitehead (2004) and European Mortgage Federation (2012a). Research is still inconclusive
on the causes of the cross-country heterogeneity, but likely reasons include government policies, historical
path dependence, sources of mortgage funding (capital markets vs. bank deposits), and inflation experience;
see Miles (2004), Green and Wachter (2005), and Campbell (2013). Countries also differ in terms of prepay-
ment penalties, costs of refinancing, recourse, prevalence of teaser rates, the frequency of ARM resets, and
the ARM reference rate. Our analysis abstracts from these details.
mortgage debt to (annual) GDP ratio in developed economies has reached on average 70% in
2009, although there is a large cross-country variation (International Monetary Fund, 2011,
Chapter 3). In some countries outstanding mortgage debt is even larger than government
debt and its maturity is longer.2
In light of these facts, this paper provides a conceptual and quantitative analysis of the
role of the long-term nominal aspect of mortgages in the monetary transmission mechanism
at the aggregate level. In order to accommodate the mortgage market structures of different
countries, both FRM and ARM contracts are studied. First, in a simple partial equilibrium
setup, the paper describes the channels through which this aspect of mortgages transmits
nominal shocks to the real economy. These channels are then embedded in a calibrated
general equilibrium model. The purpose of this exercise is to impose general equilibrium
discipline on the problem, given its aggregate context, and assess the quantitative importance
of the mechanism. To isolate the effect of the long-term nominal aspect of mortgages, we
abstract from all other nominal rigidities (sticky prices, wages, etc.), as well as other channels
through which housing finance affects the macroeconomy (default, home equity lines of credit
in providing liquidity, primary-secondary spread, etc.).
The nominal rigidity in question is studied in an environment in which homeowners do
not trade a full set of state-contingent securities with mortgage investors. Consequently,
the effective discount factors of the two agent types are not equalized state by state and
risk sharing is limited. In this setup, we identify two channels through which mortgage
contracts transmit nominal shocks into the real economy. Both channels are distinct from
the traditional real rate channel of monetary policy transmission.3
One channel works through the cost of new mortgage loans (‘price effect’). In essence, it is
a dynamic version of the tilt effect, previously studied in static settings (e.g., Schwab, 1982).
Expected future inflation, transmitted into nominal mortgage interest rates, redistributes
2Hilscher, Raviv, and Reis (2014) document that in the United States government debt has predominantly
short-term maturity.
3The real rate channel, whereby the central bank directly affects the ex-ante short-term real interest rate,
is described by, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1995). In our model, the real interest rate responds to monetary
policy shocks only indirectly through general equilibrium effects.
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real mortgage payments over the life of the loan so as to leave mortgage investors indifferent
between new mortgages and other assets. If this results in real payments increasing in
periods/states in which income has high value to homeowners, the effective cost of the
mortgage to homeowners increases. This effect is qualitatively the same under both FRM
and ARM.
The other channel works through the effects of inflation on the real value of mortgage pay-
ments of outstanding debt (‘income effect’).4 Under incomplete asset markets, mortgages
translate inflation shocks into shocks to real disposable income. This channel is qualita-
tively different under the two contracts. Under FRM, higher inflation reduces real mortgage
payments; under ARM, higher inflation increases real mortgage payments, if it sufficiently
transmits into higher nominal interest rates. Under FRM, the effects grow gradually over
time through accumulated inflation. Under ARM they are immediate and resemble the ef-
fects of an increase in the real interest rate, even when the real rate itself does not change.
This is because the effect, on real mortgage payments, of the immediate increase in the
nominal interest rate dominates the offsetting gradual effect of higher inflation.
The general equilibrium model, which embeds the two channels, consists of homeowners
and capital owners/mortgage investors. There is a representative agent of each type. Such
a coarse split of the population is motivated by Campbell and Cocco (2003): in the data,
the 3rd and 4th quintiles of the wealth distribution represent typical homeowners; the 5th
quintile represents capital owners.5 As an approximation to the characteristics in the data,
homeowners in the model derive income from labor and invest in housing capital, financing
a given fraction of housing investment with mortgages. Capital owners do not work and
invest in capital used in production, one-period nominal bonds, and mortgages, pricing the
assets competitively by arbitrage. Homeowners can also access the one-period bond market,
but at a cost. The production side is standard and monetary policy is characterized by an
4Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Mishkin (2007) refer to this effect also as a ‘cash flow’ or ‘household
balance sheet’ effect.




In equilibrium, the stochastic properties of short- and long-term nominal interest rates
depend on the parameters of exogenous shock processes. Using the model, the persistence and
standard deviations of two of these shocks—to the monetary policy rule (a nominal shock)
and the one-period bond market (a real shock)—are estimated by matching the volatility
and persistence of the long-term nominal interest rate and the long-short spread. Similarly
to Atkeson and Kehoe (2009), the nominal shock turns out to be highly persistent, shifting
the level of the nominal yield curve and inflation, the other shock fairly temporary, affecting
the slope of the yield curve and the ex-ante real interest rate.6 Given these estimates, the
model is used as a laboratory to quantitatively assess the real effects of the nominal shock,
which—like the level factor in the data, e.g., Piazzesi (2006)—is the more important of the
two shocks for nominal interest rates (in contrast, existing money-macro literature mainly
studies shocks affecting the real rate). The main focus is on housing investment, where the
shock should matter the most, but responses of other variables are also studied.7
The findings are summarized in three points. First, the real effects of the nominal shock
turn out to be stronger under ARM than FRM: a one percentage point (annualized) down-
ward shift of the nominal yield curve and inflation generates, on impact, a 1.8% increase in
housing investment under ARM, whereas a 0.7% decline under FRM (0.15% decline with
refinancing).8 The magnitude of the response under ARM is similar to that occurring due
to shocks affecting the real interest rate, typically studied in the literature. The finding that
the effects are stronger under ARM than FRM may seem surprising as, a-priori, one may
expect that a contract fixing nominal payments for the entire term will generate larger real
effects. The failure to do so is because under FRM the increase in real mortgage payments
due to lower inflation (income effect) is only gradual and is partially offset by less expensive
6In the model, risk premia are constant and all effects of the shocks on the yield curve work through
expectations hypothesis.
7There are two additional shocks: to total factor productivity and the marginal rate of transformation
between housing and nonhousing use of output. Together, the four shocks produce standard deviations of
endogenous variables, and their correlations with output, consistent with the cyclical moments of U.S. data.
8The responses are symmetric for an upward shift of the yield curve, except in the case of refinancing.
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new loans (price effect). In contrast, under ARM, the drop in the mortgage rate has an
immediate effect on the real mortgage payments of the outstanding debt (income effect) and
this is further supported by cheaper new loans (price effect). Refinancing, while in principle
making FRM look like ARM when interest rates decline, does not overturn the result. This
is because, once calibrated to the data, refinancing accounts, on average, for at most 2%
of the outstanding debt per quarter.9 When FRMs and ARMs coexist, the real effects lie
in-between the two separate cases.
Second, under both contracts, the size of the real effects declines with the persistence of
the nominal shock (i.e., when the shock starts to affect mainly the slope of the yield curve,
rather than its level). This is because what matters with long-term loans is the expected
path of inflation, and nominal interest rates, over the entire term of the loan.
And third, persistently higher inflation redistributes income from capital owners to home-
owners under FRM, but (at least initially) from homeowners to capital owners under ARM.
The redistribution is gradual under FRM, but immediate under ARM, working through a
pass through to nominal interest rates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 connects the paper with the literature. Section
2 explains the main ideas. Section 3 describes the general equilibrium model. Section 4
cross-validates the model against empirical studies. Section 5 reports findings from the main
computational experiments. Section 6 concludes and offers suggestions for future research.
Supplementary material contains (i) a summary of equilibrium conditions, (ii) computation,
(iii) data counterparts to the variables, (iv) estimates of mortgage debt servicing costs for
the United States, (v) details of calibration, (vi) details of optimal refinancing, and (vii)
details of optimal mortgage choice.
9Even though the refinancing fraction can as much as double in response to realistic drops in interest
rates, it is still insufficient to overturn the findings. Of course, given the large size of the stock, the small
variation in the refi fraction of the stock shows up as a large variation in the share of refi loans in new loans,
reported periodically by Freddie Mac.
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1 Related studies
The paper is related to different strands of a growing literature on monetary policy, housing,
and debt. First, following Iacoviello (2005), a number of studies focus on the interaction be-
tween sticky prices and the collateral value of housing, whereby housing facilitates borrowing
for general consumption purposes, similar to home equity lines of credit (Iacoviello, 2010,
contains a brief summary of this line of research). To this end, loans in these models are
short-term one-period loans.10 We abstract from this channel, focusing instead on the role
of mortgages as loans for house purchase (i.e., first mortgages) and stressing their long-term
nominal aspect in transmitting nominal shocks to the real economy.11
Second, following Doepke and Schneider (2006), there is work on the redistributive ef-
fects of inflation under incomplete markets and nominal debt (Meh, Rios-Rull, and Terajima,
2010; Sheedy, 2013; Doepke, Schneider, and Selezneva, 2015). This research focuses on debt
contracts with fixed nominal payments, similar to FRM loans. However, we show that the
redistributive consequences of inflation are quite opposite under ARM contracts. Policy rec-
ommendations based on this literature, such as nominal GDP targeting (Sheedy, 2013), are
thus inappropriate for countries with a large fraction of ARMs.12
Third, a line of research investigates, in various contexts, the effects of inflation on hous-
ing: the tax code (Piazzesi and Schneider, 2012), money illusion (Piazzesi and Schneider,
2007; Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008), and substitution between market and home pro-
duction (Aruoba, Davis, and Wright, 2012).13 In our model, inflation transmits to housing
investment through mortgage contracts.
Finally, in recent years, a few studies investigated empirically the connections between
10Rubio (2011) extends the Iacoviello (2005) framework by considering one-period loans with interest rates
evolving in a sluggish manner, as weighted averages of past interest rates, interpreting such loans as FRMs.
Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013) distinguish between ARMs, modeled as one-period loans, and FRMs,
modeled as two-period loans.
11Ghent (2012) considers long-term FRM loans denominated in real, rather than nominal, terms.
12Auclert (2014) studies redistributive effects of monetary policy working through a real rate channel.
Redistributive effects of monetary policy are also at the heart of the transmission mechanism proposed by
Sterk and Tenreyro (2013).
13Earlier studies include Lessard and Modigliani (1975), Kearl (1979), Schwab (1982), Alm and Follain
(1984), and Poterba (1984).
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monetary policy and mortgage contracts. Villar Burke (2015) compares interest rates on
outstanding mortgage debt and new mortgage loans in a sample of Eurozone countries in
a period around the cut in the European Central Bank’s policy rate in 2008/2009. In
countries in which FRMs dominate there was almost no change in the interest rate on the
pool of outstanding mortgages. In contrast, in countries in which ARMs dominate, the
interest rate on the pool declined almost in parallel with the policy rate. The responses of
interest rates on new loans also differed across countries, declining more moderately in FRM
countries than in ARM countries. Consistency with these empirical findings is at the core
of the mechanism in our model.
Calza et al. (2013), using a VAR model based on the usual identification strategy, find
stronger negative responses of housing investment to positive monetary policy shocks in
ARM then FRM countries.14 The shock they identify is closer to the real interest rate shock
in our model, than the nominal shock we focus on, in the sense that it increases the ex-
ante real interest rate. Nevertheless, our model is consistent with their finding, producing
stronger negative responses to the real interest rate shock under ARM than FRM.
Di Maggio, Kermani, and Ramcharan (2014) and Keys, Piskorski, Seru, and Yao (2014)
exploit the variation across U.S. counties in the use of FRM and ARM contracts to investigate
the responses of consumption to the 2008 cut in the Fed funds rate using household-level
data. Both studies find that counties with a larger share of ARMs in the existing pool
of loans experienced a much larger boost in homeowners’ consumption than counties with
a larger share of FRMs. While the authors are careful to control for other channels that
could potentially lead to such an outcome, identification can always be an issue in reduced-
form analysis. Our model provides a theoretical general-equilibrium underpinning for such
empirical findings. The model can also replicate the empirical marginal propensities of
consumption, documented by Di Maggio et al. (2014).15
14Earlier VAR studies of housing investment include Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and
Iacoviello and Minetti (2008).
15Cloyne, Ferreira, and Surico (2015) also use household-level data. They attempt to identify changes in
nominal interest rates in the United States and the United Kingdom due to monetary policy surprises. While
they find substantial differences in the responses between outright homeowners and mortgagors, they do not
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2 A simple partial equilibrium model
The main ideas of the paper can be conveyed within a simple partial equilibrium model. We
describe the two channels of transmission (price and income effects) under FRM and ARM,
explain why the combined effect is stronger under ARM, and discuss under what conditions
monetary policy is neutral and to what extent the results also apply to other forms of nominal
debt. Refinancing and the choice between FRM and ARM are delayed until the full model,
although we touch on these issues in Section 2.7, which provides numerical illustrations of
the price and income effects.
Throughout this section, the real interest rate and real labor income are held constant,
the one-period nominal interest rate is varied exogenously, and the current inflation rate is
also exogenous. All these variables are endogenized in the general equilibrium model. The
details of FRM and ARM loans differ across countries. We abstract from the details and
focus on the key common features.16
2.1 A mortgage-financed house purchase
There are three periods, with time denoted by t = 1, 2, 3. Each period a household is endowed
with constant real income w and in t = 1 has no outstanding mortgage debt (outstanding
debt is considered later). In t = 1, the household makes a once-and-for-all house purchase,
financing a fraction θ of the purchase with a loan and a fraction 1−θ with income. The loan
can be used only for house purchase and the house lasts for t = 2, 3, then it fully depreciates.







β is a discount factor, ct is period-t nonhousing consumption, h is housing, and u(.) and g(.)
have standard properties. The household maximizes utility with respect to c1, c2, c3, and
h, subject to three per-period budget constraints: c1 + h = w + l/p1, c2 = w −m2/p2, and
find large differences between the responses of mortgagors in the two countries.
16For instance, in the United States, the ARM rate may not change at the same frequency as the monetary
policy rate, as in our model. Typically, the ARM rate changes only once a year. In addition, many ARMs
have an initial period for which the rate is fixed. In contrast, tracker mortgages, common for instance in
Ireland, change the mortgage rate whenever the policy rate of the European Central Bank changes.
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c3 = w −m3/p3, where l = θp1h is the nominal value of the loan, m2 and m3 are nominal
mortgage payments, and pt is the aggregate price level (i.e., the price of goods in terms of
an abstract unit of account; this section abstracts from house prices).
Assume there is a financial market that prices assets by the no-arbitrage principle but
in which the household does not participate due to, for instance, high entry costs. This
exclusion is reflected in the sequence of the budget constraints above, which do not allow for
financial instruments other than the mortgage (in the full model this assumption is partially
relaxed, but maintaining it at this stage brings out the key aspects of the mechanism more
clearly). Assume that monetary policy controls the one-period nominal interest rate it. No-
arbitrage pricing implies the Fisher effect: 1 + πt+1 = (1+ it)/(1 + r), where 1 + r is a gross
real interest rate, given by some exogenous effective discount factor (intertemporal rate of
substitution) of investors, μ∗ = (1+r)−1, and πt+1 ≡ pt+1/pt−1 is the inflation rate between
periods t and t + 1. A given it thus pins down πt+1.
Mortgage payments have a general form, m2 ≡ (iM2 +γ)l and m3 ≡ (iM3 +1)(1−γ)l. Here,
iMt denotes the mortgage interest rate, henceforth referred to as the ‘mortgage rate’. Under
FRM, iM2 = i
M
3 = i
F ; under ARM, iM2 and i
M
3 may be different. Further, γ is the amortization
rate in the first period of the life of the mortgage, when the outstanding nominal debt is l.
In the second period, the outstanding nominal debt is (1− γ)l and the amortization rate is
equal to one (i.e., the mortgage is repaid in full). For a standard mortgage, γ is calculated








F + γ) +Q
(2)
1 (i
F + 1)(1− γ), (1)
17It is easy to verify that a higher iM2 implies higher mortgage payments, despite the fact that γ changes
to equalize the payments between the two periods. Observe that to equalize the payments, γ = 1/(2 + iM2 ).
Therefore, dγ/diM2 = −1/(2+iM2 )2 ∈ (−0.25, 0). That is, when the mortgage rate increases, the amortization
rate needs to decline, but the decline is small. Overall, mortgage payments therefore increase. As a first
pass, we can therefore abstract from changes in the amortization rate when studying the effects of interest









are the period-1 prices of one- and two-period zero-coupon bonds, determined according to
the expectations hypothesis. The no-arbitrage condition (1) states that the present value
of payments from a mortgage of size one dollar is equal to one dollar. In the ARM case,
iM2 = i1 and i
M



















The price effect refers to the effect of monetary policy on the cost of new mortgages.18
By ‘monetary policy’ we mean a sequence of short-term nominal interest rates i1 and i2.
The sequence is known to the household (and the investors). Generally speaking, different
sequences of nominal interest rates (and the resulting inflation) lead to different sequences
of real mortgage payments over the life of the loan, so as to ensure that the present value of
the one-dollar loan is equal to one dollar, as dictated by the above no-arbitrage pricing by
investors. This, however, affects the value of the loan from the household’s perspective, as the
household does not have—due to the assumed market incompleteness—the same valuation
of the real mortgage payments as the investors.
Specifically, after substituting the budget constraints in the utility function, the first-
order condition for the utility maximization problem of the household with respect to h
gives










(iM3 + 1)(1− γ)
(1 + π2)(1 + π3)
]}
(3)
is a wedge between the marginal utility of period-1 nonhousing consumption and the marginal
18While the price effect is discussed in a deterministic setup, which is the simplest setup in which it can
be demonstrated, it is straightforward to extend it to stochastic settings.
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lifetime utility of housing. Further, μt,t+1 ≡ βu′(ct+1)/u′(ct) is the household’s effective
discount factor. The wedge—working like a relative price of housing—captures the cost of
mortgage finance from the household’s perspective. To see this, observe that the expression
in the square brackets is the present value of real mortgage payments, discounted with the
household’s effective discount factor, μt,t+1, rather than the effective discount factor of the









(iF + 1)(1− γ)
(1 + π2)(1 + π3)
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where, in the second term, we have used the Fisher effect (1 + i2)/(1 + π3) = (μ
∗)−1.
To explain the effect of monetary policy on the wedge, it is easier to start with the ARM
case. A decline in i1, for instance, reduces the real payments in the first period of the life of
the loan, (i1 + γ)/(1 + π2). To see this, observe that through the Fisher effect, π2 declines
one-for-one with i1 but—as γ is less than one—the effect of i1 on the numerator is larger than
the effect of π2 on the denominator. The decline in π2, however, increases the real payments
in the second period of the life of the loan, (μ∗)−1(1−γ)/(1+π2). If the household’s effective
discount factor assigns a sufficiently large weight on payments in the first period of the life
of the loan, mortgage finance becomes cheaper for the household and the wedge declines,
inducing more housing investment. In the FRM case, the effect is similar, as long as iF
sufficiently declines in response to the decline in the short rate. This will be the case if the
decline in the short rate is persistent; i.e., both i1 and i2 decline. The lower inflation rates,
π2 and π3, increase real payments in the second period of the life of the FRM loan, but again,
the wedge declines if the those payments are sufficiently discounted.19
19The intuition extends to multiperiod loans. Holding the nominal payments to income ratio constant
across loans of different maturities (i.e., adjusting the size of the loan accordingly), we can show that the
11
2.3 Income effect
The income effect refers to the effect of monetary policy on the real value of payments on
outstanding mortgage debt. It concerns ex-post changes in inflation and, in the case of ARM,
also nominal interest rates. Effectively, mortgages translate nominal shocks to inflation and
nominal interest rates into shocks to real mortgage payments and disposable income.
To make the discussion concrete, consider a household in period t = 1, that took out a
mortgage in period t = 0. The mortgage matures in t = 3 (to show the income effect under
ARM, the minimum length of the loan has to be three periods). By ‘monetary policy’ we
mean a sequence π1, i1, and i2, which becomes known to the household in period t = 1;
i.e., one period after the household took out the loan (in this sense it is a monetary policy
‘surprise’). Specifically, suppose that monetary policy reduces π1, i1, and i2.
20 Through the
Fisher effect, i1 and i2 again pin down π2 and π3, respectively.












(1 + π1)(1 + π2)





(1 + π1)(1 + π2)(1 + π3)
(1− γ2)(1− γ1)l̃0, in t = 3,
where γ1 and γ2 are the amortization rates in the first and second periods of the life of the loan
and l̃0 ≡ l0/p0 is the real size of the loan in period t = 0. Under FRM, iM1 = iM2 = iM3 = iF0 .
Under ARM, iM1 = i0, i
M
2 = i1, and i
M
3 = i2.
front- and back-end effects become stronger the longer is the term of the loan. At the front end, for
a sufficiently small inflation rate,
iMt+1+γt+1
1+πt+1
≈ iMt+1 + γt+1 ≈ iMt+1, which holds since γt+1 → 0, as the
term of the loan increases. Changes in real mortgage payments at the front end are thus approximately
equal to changes in the nominal interest rate. At the back end, for a small enough nominal interest rate,
iMt+ι+γt+ι
(1+πt+ι)+...+(1+πt+1)
≈ γt+ι(1+πt+ι)+...+(1+πt+1) , which holds since γt+ι → 1 as the end of the term approaches.
The denominator becomes larger with the term of the loan, increasing the accumulated inflation effect at
the back end. In contrast, when the loan is a one-period loan (γt+1 = 1), (i
M
t+1 + 1)/(1 + πt+1) = 1 + r, as
iMt+1 = it, and there is no price effect.
20In the general equilibrium model, such a joint decline in nominal interest rates and current inflation is
an equilibrium outcome.
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Unlike the price effect, the income effect works in opposite directions under FRM and
ARM. Broadly speaking, in the FRM case, accumulated inflation affects the real value of
mortgage payments over the life of the loan. In the ARM case, however, at least in the near
term, changes in the nominal interest rate have the dominating effect on the real payments,
as in the case of the price effect. The following paragraphs provide the details, describing
the above three equations.
Starting with the payments in t = 1, the mortgage rate iM1 is predetermined; it is equal
to some iF0 under FRM and to i0, the period-0 short rate, under ARM, both determined in
period t = 0. Clearly, a decline in π1 generates a negative income effect for the household in
t = 1.
Regarding payments in t = 2, there is still the lingering effect of the decline in π1. More





decline in i1 increases the real payments further due to the resulting decline in π2. In the
ARM case, the effects are different. Here, iM2 = i1 and a decline in i1 reduces the real
mortgage payments, even though π2 declines one-for-one with i1 (again, as γ2 ∈ (0, 1), the
effect of i1 on the numerator is larger than the effect of π2 on the denominator). The decline
in the nominal interest rate thus works like a decline in the real interest rate, reducing real
interest payments on the loan.
Finally, the real payments in t = 3 increase under both contracts, due to the accumulated
effect of persistently lower inflation.
2.4 Both effects
What happens when both effects are taken into account? Under FRM, a decline in the
nominal interest rate reduces the cost of new housing investment, but increases real pay-
ments on outstanding debt. Under ARM, both the cost of new housing investment and real
payments on outstanding debt decline (the latter at least in the near term). Furthermore,
the increase in real mortgage payments on outstanding debt under FRM is gradual, whereas
13
the decline under ARM is immediate. Potential general equilibrium adjustments aside, one
would therefore expect monetary policy to be more potent under ARM than FRM loans.
2.5 Monetary policy neutrality
Generally speaking, if asset markets were complete, the Modigliani-Miller theorem would
apply in our setting and debt finance (including its form, FRM or ARM) would be irrelevant.
As a result, monetary policy would be neutral.






(iM3 + 1)(1− γ)
(1 + π2)(1 + π3)
.
Thus, if asset markets were complete—implying μt,t+1 equal to μ
∗—the expression in the
square brackets in equation (3) would be equal to one and the wedge τH would be equal
to zero. Intuitively, the household’s valuation of mortgage payments in every period (and
more generally in every state) would be the same as that of the investor. And because
the investor’s no-arbitrage pricing implies that the present value of mortgage payments is
equal to one, the household’s valuation would also be equal to one. This holds regardless
of what monetary policy does. Furthermore, under complete markets, the agents would
be mutually insured against redistributive income shocks, making their income immune to
monetary policy surprises. The income effect would therefore be eliminated.
Monetary policy would also be neutral if asset markets were generally incomplete, but
complete with respect to inflation. That is, if the nominal rigidity in mortgages could be effec-
tively removed from the economy. Suppose μt,t+1 = μ∗, but consider, for instance, mortgages
that are index-linked, adjusting the principal for changes in the price level. The nominal pay-
ments of such mortgages are m2 = (i
M
2 +γ)(1+π2)l and m3 = (i
M
3 +1)(1−γ)(1+π2)(1+π3)l
and no-arbitrage pricing implies iM2 = i
M
3 = r. Converting the nominal payments to real,
m2/p2 = (r+γ)l̃ and m3/p3 = (r+1)(1−γ)l̃, shows that the real payments do not depend on
nominal variables. The income effect is thus absent. The wedge also does not depend on nom-
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inal variables, but is generally nonzero: τH = −θ {1− [μ12(γ + r) + μ12μ23(r + 1)(1− γ)]}.
2.6 Discussion: other types of nominal debt
The focus of the paper is on mortgages, as opposed to corporate debt, as long-term corporate
assets are less debt-dependent than housing and presumably corporations operate closer to
complete asset markets than do households.21 Nevertheless, the two channels of transmission
in principle apply also to the corporate sector. Long-term corporate debt usually takes the
form of coupon bonds, which result in our setup when γ1 = γ2 = 0. With such amortization
schedule, the nominal payments are concentrated in the final period of the loan and the real
effects of monetary policy work predominantly by affecting the real value of those payments
through accumulated inflation.22
Within the household sector, our analysis applies also to auto loans, which have a similar
payment structure as FRMs. We abstract from auto loans as mortgage debt has a longer
term (the usual term of auto loans is only five years) and makes up a much larger fraction
of household debt than auto loans.
2.7 Numerical illustrations
The three-period model has limitations to illustrate how the price and income effects vary
with inflation persistence and what is the realistic size of the effects for a typical household.
We therefore conclude this section with numerical examples, based on a standard 30-year
mortgage, to illustrate these effects quantitatively.
Figure 1 plots debt-servicing costs—the ratio of real mortgage payments (mt/pt) to real
income (w)—over the term of the loan (120 quarters) under two alternative paths of it; a
constant ‘steady-state’ it = 4% and a mean-reverting decline of it to 1% in period 1, which
we refer to as ‘monetary policy easing’. The persistence of the decline is 0.95, which is the
21Long-term corporate assets are typically more than 75% financed through retained earnings and other
forms of equity (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
22Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid (2013) study nominal corporate debt in a model in which monetary policy
affects its default value.
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average quarterly autocorrelation of the short rate in the data. All the assumptions of the
simple model—constant r and w and no-arbitrage pricing, with equation (1) extended to 120
quarters—are maintained here. The parameterization is r = 1% per annum and l̃ = 16w,
i.e., four times annual income. In the full model of the next section, the household chooses l̃
optimally (by choosing h). The point here is simply to illustrate the size of these effects for
one particular loan size.23
At the steady-state interest rate, debt-servicing costs are front-loaded and decline mono-
tonically over the life of the mortgage from 29% to 6.5%. This is the standard ‘tilt effect’
(e.g., Schwab, 1982), occurring due to a positive inflation rate (in this case 3%). This path
is a baseline against which to compare the debt-servicing costs under the monetary policy
easing.
Starting with the case of a new loan, under both FRM and ARM, monetary policy easing
reduces debt-servicing costs at the front end, where they are the highest, and somewhat
increases them at the back end, where they are the smallest. The decline under FRM is
smaller than under ARM because the FRM interest rate, due to the mean-reverting nature
of the short rate in this example, declines by less than the short rate itself. The flattening of
the path of debt-servicing costs results in a smoother consumption profile and thus a decline
in τH under a concave utility function (and/or sufficiently small β). Using a log utility
function and β = 0.9883, a parameterization of the model of the next section, τH declines
by 1.66 percentage points in the case of FRM and by 3.83 percentage points in the case of
ARM. Recall that (1+τH) can be interpreted as the effective price of new housing and, thus,
these numbers represent quarterly percentage declines in this price.24
For the case of an existing loan, we consider a loan with 119 periods remaining (the
23The parameterization of the loan size is based on the average ratio, 1975-2010, of the median price of a
new home (assuming a loan-to-value ratio of 76%) to the median household net income (assuming an income
tax rate of 23.5%). The data on house prices and gross incomes are from the U.S. Census Bureau. The loan-
to-value ratio is the average ratio for single family newly-built home mortgages (Federal Housing Finance
Agency, Monthly Interest Rate Survey, Table 10); the tax rate is a NIPA-based estimate. A historical 2%
markup is added to the interest rate.
24As the decline in the wedge is larger under ARM than FRM, given the choice, the household in this
setup would prefer the ARM loan over the FRM loan.
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magnitudes of the income effect decline as the remaining term of the loan gets shorter for
reasons analogous to those in footnote 19). In the case of ARM, as the loan is only one
period into its life, the expected path of debt-servicing costs is essentially the same as that
for the new loan. Under FRM, however, the persistently low inflation leads to a gradual
increase in debt-servicing costs for the remainder of the term of the loan. The income effect
under the two contracts thus goes in opposite directions.25
Figure 2 plots the results of the same experiment, but for two alternative degrees of
persistence: 0.99 and 0.5. In the 0.99 case, the magnitudes are much larger than in the 0.95
case. Furthermore, for new loans, the results under FRM and ARM are more similar to
each other than in the 0.95 case, as the long rate drops almost as much as the short rate.
For existing loans, however, the effects under FRM and ARM diverge further apart. When
the persistence is 0.5, the effects on both new and existing loans are small, in fact hardly
noticeable in the FRM case.
3 General equilibrium model
The general equilibrium model extends the model of the previous section to infinite horizon,
formally introduces shocks, and endogenizes the variables that were either held constant
(real labor income and the real interest rate) or were treated as exogenous (the short-term
nominal interest rate and current inflation).
3.1 Environment
The economy’s population is split into two groups, ‘homeowners’ and ‘capital owners’, with
measures Ψ and (1−Ψ), respectively. Within each group, agents are identical. An aggregate
production function combines capital and labor to produce a single good, which can be used
for consumption, capital investment, or as new housing structures; new homes consist of
25With refinancing, in the aggregate, a fraction of the outstanding FRM debt would get refinanced (the
whole stock would get refinanced if refinancing was costless). This would not be the case in the opposite
experiment of monetary policy tightening.
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new structures and new land. Capital owners own the economy’s capital stock, homeowners
supply labor. Capital owners play the role of mortgage investors, kept outside of the simple
model.26 Where applicable, the notation is the same as in Section 2. Only new variables
and functions are therefore defined. When a variable’s notation is the same for both agent
types, an asterisk (∗) denotes the variable pertaining to capital owners. Through out the
model, fiscal variables—taxes, transfers, and government spending—are included only to
ensure sensible calibration.
3.1.1 Homeowners
The representative homeowner’s problem is an extended version of the problem in Section




βt {v(ct, ht)− χt} , β ∈ (0, 1), (4)
where v(., .) has standard properties and χt is a utility cost related to refinancing and mort-
gage choice, described below. The maximization is subject to a sequence of constraints
ct + pHtxHt +
bt+1
pt











ht+1 = (1− δH)ht + xHt. (7)
Here, xHt is newly purchased homes, pHt is their relative price, bt+1 is the homeowner’s
holdings of a one-period nominal bond between periods t and t + 1, wt is a real wage rate,
n is labor, which the household supplies inelastically, τN is a labor income tax rate, τ is a
26The split of the population is motivated by Campbell and Cocco (2003). In the data, homeowners
(corresponding to the 3rd and 4th quintiles of wealth distribution) have one major asset, a house, and one
major liability, a mortgage. Their main source of income is labor income. In contrast, capital owners (the 5th
quintile) hold almost the entire corporate equity in the economy and housing is a less important component
of their asset composition; labor income is also a less important source of their income. The 1st and 2nd
quintiles are essentially renters with no assets and little liabilities and are not included in the model.
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transfer to capital owners, and δH ∈ (0, 1) is a depreciation rate of the housing stock.27 Υt−1
is a bond market participation cost, governed by a function Υ(−b̃t), where b̃t ≡ bt/pt−1 is
the homeowner’s real holdings of the bond. The function Υ(.) is assumed to be increasing
and convex and it controls the extent to which homeowners can smooth out consumption
in the presence of income fluctuations.28 In order to avoid the participation cost affecting
the definition of aggregate output, it is rebated to the homeowner in a lump-sum way as ψt,
which the homeowner takes as given. The description of mortgage payments follows after
describing the capital owner.
3.1.2 Capital owners



















+ τ ∗t +
pLt
1−Ψ , (8)
kt+1 = (1− δK)kt + xKt. (9)
Here, xKt is investment in capital, rt is the real rate of return on capital, τK is a capital
income tax rate, δK ∈ (0, 1) is a capital depreciation rate (tax deductible), kt is capital, τ ∗t
27As in the three-period model, θ is a parameter. Empirical evidence supports this assumption at the
aggregate level: over the period 1973-2006, there has been very little variation in the cross-sectional average
of the loan-to-value ratio for single family newly-built home first mortgages, despite large changes in interest
rates and other macroeconomic conditions (Federal Housing Finance Agency, Monthly Interest Rate Survey,
Table 10).
28It is further assumed that Υ(.) = 0 when b̃t = 0, Υ(.) > 0 when b̃t < 0 (the homeowner is borrowing),
and Υ(.) < 0 when b̃t > 0 (the homeowner is saving). We think of Υ(.) > 0 as capturing a premium
for unsecured consumer credit, which is increasing in the amount borrowed. Υ(.) < 0 can be interpreted
as higher intermediation costs for homeowners than capital owners, which reduces the homeowers’ returns
on savings below those of capital owners. In steady state, b̃ = 0. A technical role of the cost function is
that, as in two-country business cycle models with incomplete markets, it prevents the one-period debt from
becoming a random walk in a log-linear solution of the model. In other words, it keeps the log-linearized
model stationary.
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is a lump-sum transfer, 1/(1 − Ψ) is new residential land, which the capital owner receives
each period as an endowment, and pLt is its relative price. In addition, τbt is a stochastic tax
rate on income from the one-period bond market. The tax rate follows a stationary AR(1)
process τb,t+1 = ρbτbt + εb,t+1, where εbt ∼ iidN(0, σb). The tax proceeds from this tax are
rebated back to the capital owner in a lump-sum way as a part of τ ∗t . As discussed below, τbt
shows up as a wedge in the capital owner’s Euler equation for bonds and affects the ex-ante
real interest rate. In a reduced form way, this wedge captures various primitive shocks and
frictions that affect the ex-ante real interest rate (see Šustek, 2011).29 Under no-arbitrage
pricing, the capital owner is indifferent across investing in mortgages, bonds, and capital.
His composition of period-t investment is therefore pinned down by homeowners’ demand
for new mortgages and the one-period bond.
3.1.3 Mortgages
In the interest of clarity, we start by describing FRMs and ARMs in their simple forms;
i.e., no refinancing or choice between the contracts. The modeling of mortgages is based
on Kydland, Rupert, and Šustek (2016), who consider infinitely-lived loans, which neverthe-
less contain the key characteristics of standard (finitely-lived) mortgages. Denoting by dt
the period-t stock of outstanding nominal mortgage debt of the homeowner, the nominal
mortgage payments the homeowner has to make in period t are
mt = (Rt + γt)dt, (10)
where Rt and γt are, respectively, the interest and amortization rates of the outstanding
debt. The variables determining mt are state variables evolving as
dt+1 = (1− γt)dt + lt, (11)
29By subjecting only the capital owner to this wedge, it is assumed that the wedge captures frictions
related only to the ‘wholesale’ financial market, in which mortgage investors participate, as opposed to the
‘retail’ financial market, in which homeowners participate. As discussed below, the main results are not
sensitive as to which agent is subjected to the wedge.
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(1− φt)Rt + φtiFt , if FRM,
it, if ARM,
(13)
with φt ≡ lt/dt+1 denoting the fraction of new loans in the outstanding debt next period. The
amortization rate γt+1 and the interest rate Rt+1 in the FRM case thus evolve as weighted
averages of the amortization and interest rates, respectively, on the existing stock and new
loans. κ, α ∈ (0, 1) are parameters. Specifically, κ is the initial amortization rate of a new
loan and α controls the evolution of the amortization rate over time. Notice that setting
α = 0 and κ = 1 implies γt = 1 ∀t. That is, lt becomes a one-period loan. Setting α = 1
results in a constant amortization rate γt = κ and thus declining nominal mortgage payments
over the life of the loan. Recall from Section 2 that in order to keep mortgage payments
constant over the life of a loan, the amortization rate has to be increasing. When κ, α ∈ (0, 1),
the amortization rate increases, converging to one. Kydland et al. (2016) show that κ and
α can be chosen so as to approximate the payments of a standard 30-year mortgage.30








d∗t+1 = (1− γ∗t )d∗t + l∗t , (15)




(1− φ∗t )R∗t + φ∗t iFt , if FRM,
it, if ARM,
(17)
where φ∗t ≡ l∗t /d∗t+1. Under FRM, the first-order condition for l∗t pins down iFt such that
the capital owner is indifferent between new mortgages and rolling over the one-period bond
30Under appropriate choice of κ and α, even though the loan has an infinite life, it gets essentially repayed
within 30 years and the nominal payments are approximately constant for most of these 30 years, conditional
on a constant mortgage rate. Such modeling of mortgages is convenient, as both the agents and loans have
an infinite life, thus allowing a simple recursive representation of the model.
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from period t on. The first-order condition is an infinite-horizon counterpart to equation (1);
see Appendix A in the supplementary material.
3.1.4 Refi loans
Chen, Michaux, and Roussanov (2013) document that 60% of refi loans in the United States
are unrelated to interest rate changes (instead serving the purpose of liquidity withdrawals).
Given our interest, we abstract from this type of refinancing. Chen et al. (2013) further
demonstrate that the remaining fraction is negatively related to a difference between the
current FRM interest rate and an average of its past values. This is the relationship we
intend to capture.
With refinancing, newly originated loans consist of mortgages used for new house pur-
chases (first mortgages) and refi loans
lt = θ(ptpHtxHt) + t(1− γt)dt. (18)
Here, t is the fraction of the outstanding debt that is being refinanced in period t (refinancing
takes place after the regular period-t amortization payment is made). Mortgage payments
are still given by mt = (Rt + γt)dt, but now with laws of motion
dt+1 = (1− t)(1− γt)dt + lt, (19)
γt+1 = (1− φt) (γt)α + φtκ, (20)
Rt+1 = (1−Θt)Rt +ΘtiFt , (21)
where φt ≡ θ(ptpHtxHt)/dt+1 is the fraction of first mortgages in the stock of debt next
period and Θt ≡ lt/dt+1 is the fraction of all newly originated loans in the stock of debt
next period. Observe that combining equations (18) and (19) gives back the original law of
motion for debt (11); i.e., prepayments and refi loans cancel out and only first mortgages
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are added to the stock of debt. An implicit assumption in the law of motion (20) is that a
new refi loan starts with an amortization rate of the loan that it replaces. This leads to a
sharp characterization of refinancing. Namely, in the homeowner’s constraints, refinancing
shows up only in the law of motion (21), as a change in the weights on the old effective
interest rate Rt and the current market interest rate i
F
t , without tieing this change to new
house purchases. When t = 1, i.e., the whole existing stock is refinanced, Θt = 1 and the
evolution of Rt+1 becomes the same as under ARM. When t = 0, Θt = φt and the evolution
of Rt+1 becomes the same as in the case of the basic FRM loan, equation (13).
The capital owner’s laws of motion are analogous: d∗t+1 = (1− t)(1− γ∗t )d∗t + l∗t , γ∗t+1 =
(1− φ∗t ) (γ∗t )α+ φ∗tκ, and R∗t+1 = (1−Θ∗t )R∗t +Θ∗t iFt , where φ∗t = [l∗t − t(1− γ∗t )d∗t ]/d∗t+1 and
Θ∗t ≡ l∗t /d∗t+1, with t taken as given. The capital owner’s first-order condition for l∗t (gross
lending) again determines iFt . Observe that, as the evolution of d
∗
t+1 depends on t, the FRM
rate iFt depends on the refinancing behavior of homeowners (i.e., ρt shows up in a first-order
condition for l∗t ). The current FRM rate i
F
t thus prices in the expected refinancing behavior
of homeowners.31




Δ and χt = 0 if i
F
t ≥ Rt,
̃t and χt = Γ (̃t) if i
F
t < Rt.
Here, Δ is a parameter, representing a refi fraction occurring due to exogenous reasons (e.g.,
moving house), ̃t is chosen optimally, and Γ(̃t) is a function with Γ(̃t)
′′ > 0 and a minimum
Γ(̃t) = 0 at ̃t = Δ. The utility cost χt can be interpreted, for instance, as a time loss.
When we abstract from refinancing, we set t ≡ 0 and χt ≡ 0.
31With refinancing, the left-hand side of the capital owner’s budget constraint (8) needs to be modified:
l∗t gets replaced with l
∗
t − t(1 − γ∗t )d∗t (i.e., it is first mortgages in both cases).
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3.1.5 Mortgage choice
Allowing for endogenous choice between new FRM and ARM loans requires keeping track
of the two types of debt separately. Therefore, mortgage payments of the homeowner are
mt = m1t +m2t, where m1t are payments on outstanding FRM debt and m2t are payments
on outstanding ARM debt. These two variables are determined by separate laws of motion
(11)-(13), as applicable, each with its own new loans, l1t for FRM and l2t for ARM. The
mortgage payments received by the capital owner are specified analogously. The financing
constraint of the homeowner becomes
l1t + l2t = lt, with lt = θptpHtxHt. (22)
The homeowner faces a cost function Φ(l2t/lt), assumed to satisfy Φ(l2t/lt)
′′ > 0 with a mini-
mum Φ(l2t/lt) = 0 at l2t/lt = Λ, where Λ > 0 is a parameter. As in the case of refinancing, it
is assumed that the cost takes the form of the utility loss χt. A way to think about the param-
eter Λ is as representing a ‘normal’ share of ARM loans in the economy, determined by various
institutional and historical factors, noted in footnote 1 and not modeled here, and the cost
function represents the economy’s costs of deviating away from this norm. This simple mod-
eling strategy is in the spirit of the ideas suggested by Badarinza, Campbell, and Ramadorai
(2014). The capital owner takes the mortgage choice by the homeowner as given but the
first-order condition for l∗1t again determines the mortgage rate i
F
t , so as to leave the capital
owner indifferent between the two types of new loans (and other assets).
3.1.6 Technology
An aggregate production function, operated by perfectly competitive producers, is given
by Yt = Atf(Kt, Nt), where Kt is the aggregate capital stock, Nt is aggregate labor, and
f(., .) has the standard neoclassical properties. Total factor productivity (TFP) follows
a stationary AR(1) process logAt+1 = (1 − ρA) logA + ρA logAt + εA,t+1, where A is the
unconditional mean and εAt ∼ iidN(0, σA). The real rate of return on capital, rt, and the
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real wage rate, wt, are determined by the marginal products of capital and labor, respectively.
The resource constraint of the economy is Ct + C
∗
t + XKt + qtXSt + G = Yt, where XSt is
new housing structures and G is constant government expenditures (capital letters denote
aggregate counterparts to lower-case letters introduced earlier). Here, qt is the marginal rate
of transformation between new housing structures and the other uses of output, and hence
the relative price of new housing structures. It is given as qt = ηtq(XSt), where q(XSt) is a
convex function that makes the economy’s production possibilities frontier (PPF) concave in
the space of (Ct +XKt+G) and (XSt)—a specification akin to that of Huffman and Wynne
(1999), a stand-in for the costs of moving factors of production across different sectors of
the economy. Further, ηt is a shock following a stationary AR(1) process ηt+1 = (1 − ρq) +
ρqηt + εq,t+1, with unconditional mean equal to one and εqt ∼ iidN(0, σq). This shock can
be thought of as a housing construction shock. The shocks At and ηt are relevant only for
cross-validating the model against business cycle moments of the data.
As in Davis and Heathcote (2005), new homes consist of new housing structures and
land and are produced by perfectly competitive homebuilders according to an aggregate
production function XHt = g(XSt, XLt). Here, XHt is the aggregate number of new homes
constructed in period t, XLt is the aggregate new residential land, and g has the standard
neoclassical properties.
3.1.7 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor-type rule with a stochastic inflation target (e.g.,
Ireland, 2007)
it = (i+ πt − π) + νπ(πt − πt), νπ > 1, (23)
where i is the steady-state short-term nominal interest rate, and πt is the inflation target.
The inflation target follows a stationary AR(1) process πt+1 = (1−ρπ)π+ρππt+επ,t+1, where
π is a steady-state inflation rate, and επ,t+1 ∼ iidN(0, σπ). Notice that the interest rate rule
can be rewritten in a more typical form as it = i+νπ(πt−π)+ξt, where ξt ≡ −(νπ−1)(πt−π).
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3.2 Equilibrium
To economize on space and notation, the equilibrium is defined only for the case of separate
FRM and ARM loans in their basic form.32 Let zt ≡ [logAt, πt, τbt, ηt, pt−1] be the vector
of exogenous state variables and a lagged value of the price level, s∗t ≡ [kt, b∗t , d∗t , γ∗t , R∗t ] the
vector of the capital owner’s state variables, st ≡ [ht, bt, dt, γt, Rt] the vector of the home-
owner’s state variables, and St ≡ [Kt, Ht, Bt, Dt,Γt,t] the vector of aggregate endogenous
state variables, where the elements are, respectively, aggregate capital, housing stock, bonds,
outstanding mortgage debt, and its amortization and interest rates. Next, write the capital
owner’s optimization problem as












where a prime denotes a value next period and the constraints (8), (9), and (14)-(17) are
thought to have been substituted in the utility and value functions. Similarly, write the
homeowner’s problem as




v(c, h)− χ+ βE[V (z′, S ′, s′)|z]
}
, (25)
where the constraints (5)-(7) and (10)-(13) are thought to have been substituted in the utility
and value functions. Let Wt ≡ [XKt, pt, iMt , XHt, Bt+1] be the vector of aggregate decision
variables and prices, where iMt = i
F
t under FRM and i
M
t = it under ARM. Define a function
Wt = W (zt, St).
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32Accommodating refinancing and mortgage choice simply involves expanding the vector of decision vari-
ables of the homeowner by including the additional choice variable, either t or l2t. In the case of mortgage
choice, the state space is larger than in the case of the separate contracts, as there are two sets of the
mortgage state variables, one for each type of debt.
33With refinancing, the capital owner’s laws of motion (15)-(17) are replaced with their refi counterparts.
Similarly, the homeowner’s laws of motion (11)-(13) are replaced with their refi counterparts. In addition,
the homeowner’s maximization is also with respect to t and an aggregate counterpart to t is an element
of Wt. Further, the mortgage market clearing condition noted below is replaced with (1 − Ψ)(l∗t /pt) =
Ψ[θ(pHtxHt) + t(1 − γt)dt/pt]. With mortgage choice, the homeowner’s maximization is also with respect
to l1t and l2t, subject to l1t = θ(ptpHtxHt) − l2t, and the aggregate counterpart to l2t is a part of Wt. In
the capital owner’s problem, maximization with respect to l∗t is replaced with l
∗
1t. Mortgage market clearing
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A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of the functions U , V , and W such that:
(i) U and V solve (24) and (25), respectively; (ii) rt and wt are given by the respective
marginal products of capital and labor, pHt and pLt are given by the respective marginal
products of structures and land, and qt = ηtq(XSt); (iii) it is given by the monetary policy
rule (23); (iv) the bond, mortgage, housing, and land markets clear: (1−Ψ)b∗t+1+Ψbt+1 = 0,
(1 − Ψ)(l∗t /pt) = ΨθpHtxHt, ΨxHt = g(XSt, XLt), and XLt = 1; (v) aggregate consistency
is ensured: Kt = (1 − Ψ)kt, XKt = (1 − Ψ)xKt, XHt = ΨxHt, Bt = Ψbt, Ht = Ψht,
(1 − Ψ)m∗t = Ψmt, (1 − Ψ)d∗t = Ψdt = Dt, γ∗t = γt = Γt, R∗t = Rt = t, and (1 − Ψ)τ ∗t =
τK(rt − δK)Kt + τN (wtN − Ψτ) + Ψτ + τbt(1 − it−1)Bt/pt − G; (vi) the exogenous state
variables follow their respective stochastic processes and the endogenous aggregate state
variables evolve according to aggregate counterparts to the laws of motion for the respective
individual state variables; and (vii) the individual optimal decision rules of the capital owner
(for xK , (b
∗)
′
, and l∗) and the homeowner (for xH and b
′
) are consistent with W (z, S).34
The computational procedure is described in Appendix B in the supplementary material.
Before computing the equilibrium, the model is made stationary by dividing all nominal
variables by either pt or pt−1. Given a relatively large number of state variables, the model is
solved by log-linear approximation, adopting a version of the method of Hansen and Prescott
(1995). Thus, in the quantitative results presented, the linear equilibrium decision rules
and pricing functions are characterized by certainty equivalence, whereby only current re-
alizations and the conditional first moments of future shocks (not higher moments) affect
decisions and market clearing prices.35 In the case of refinancing, the computational method
is modified by utilizing the ideas developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015).
requires (1−Ψ)(l∗1t+ l∗2t) = Ψθ(ptpHtxHt) and (1−Ψ)l∗2t = Ψl2t. The choice of xHt and l2t by the homeowner
thus pins down l∗1t and l
∗
2t.
34In the case of ARM, iMt = it makes the capital owner indifferent between new mortgages and bonds and
the first-order condition for l∗t can be dropped from the description of the equilibrium. In the case of FRM,
the first-order condition is needed to determine iFt .
35We have explored the effects of (constant) second moments of the shocks on the equilibrium decision
rules and pricing functions, using a special case of Epstein-Zin preferences (i.e., with unitary intertemporal
elasticity of substitution) that is easy to handle by the computational method. But like Tallarini (2000) and
Backus, Ferriere, and Zin (2015), we have found little effect of the second moments on the model dynamics
for a wide range of the risk aversion parameter.
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3.3 Equilibrium nominal interest rates and inflation
The capital owner’s first-order conditions for b∗t+1 and xKt yield the Fisher equation. In a
linearized form
it − Etπt+1 ≈ Etrt+1 + Etτb,t+1, (26)
where (abusing notation) the variables are in percentage point deviations from steady state.
Notice that, for a given expected rate of return on capital Etrr+1, determined by the expected
marginal product of capital, an increase in Etτb,t+1 increases the ex-ante real interest rate,
it − Etπt+1. In this sense, τbt is a real rate shock.
Given stochastic processes for rt and τbt, the Fisher equation and the monetary policy
rule (23) determine, by forward substitutions, it and πt. For ρπ close to one, excluding










νπ − ρb τbt + πt. (27)












νπ − ρb τbt + πt. (28)
Thus, under the assumption that ρπ is close to one, the equilibrium short-term nominal
interest rate and inflation move, subject to general equilibrium adjustments in the expected
path of rt, one for one with the highly persistent πt shock. In this sense, in contrast to the
τbt shock, the πt shock is a purely nominal shock.
Because movements in it occurring due to the πt shock are highly persistent, the long
rate iFt moves almost as much as the short rate in response to this shock. In this sense, the
πt shock works like a level factor shock. In contrast, the τbt shock, if less persistent, has only
a temporary effect on the short rate. It thus has only a small effect on the long rate and
moves predominantly the long-short spread. We exploit these properties in calibration.36
36In the present case, where τbt affects only the capital owner’s Euler equation, the ex-ante real rate is
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4 Model cross-validation
Before proceeding to quantitatively assess the transmission mechanism under investigation,
we use three different sets of available empirical observations to cross-validate the model: (i)
business cycle moments, (ii) responses to a real interest rate shock, and (iii) the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) of ARM homeowners. As the empirical evidence is conditioned
on FRM vs. ARM, or based on ARM alone, the model in this section is also solved under
only either FRM or ARM, without refinancing.
4.1 Parameterization
For the quantitative analysis in this section and in Section 5, the following standard func-
tional forms are used: u(c∗) = log c∗, v(c, h) = ξ log c + (1 − ξ) logh, f(K,N) = KςN1−ς ,




L . Further, q(XSt) = exp(ζ(XSt − XS)), where ζ > 0 and XS is the
steady-state ratio of new housing structures to output (Y is normalized to be equal to one
in steady state). A similar functional form is used also for the bond market participation
cost: Υ(−b̃t) = exp(−ϑb̃t)− 1, where ϑ > 0 and b̃t = 0 in steady state. It is straightforward
to check that these functions satisfy the properties set out in Section 3.
The model is then calibrated to be consistent with long-run aggregate and cross-sectional
moments of U.S. data. For space constraints, the calibration is described in detail in Ap-
pendix E in the supplementary material. Here we just note that the persistence of the πt
and τbt shocks is calibrated by matching the autocorrelation of a long-term nominal interest
rate (10-year government bond yield, serving as a proxy for the 30-year mortgage rate due
to longer availability) and the long-short spread. Table 1 summarizes all parameter values.
given by equation (26) and, in a log-linearized form, the Euler equations of the two agents give Etc
∗
t+1 −
c∗t + Etτb,t+1 ≈ Etct+1 − ct − Υt (again abusing notation). If τbt affects both the capital owner’s and
homeowner’s Euler equations, by entering both agents’ budget constraints as a tax on bonds, then equation
(26) holds again but Etc
∗
t+1 − c∗t ≈ Etct+1 − ct − Υt. If τbt affects only homeowners, then we can write
it − Etπt+1 ≈ Etct+1 − ct −Υt + Etτb,t+1 and Etc∗t+1 − c∗t ≈ Etct+1 − ct −Υt + Etτb,t+1. Notice that in all
three cases, τbt (in so far it is autocorrelated) affects the ex-ante real rate, it − Etπt+1. The only difference
across the three cases is how the real rate relates to the consumption paths of the two agents. Experimenting
with the three cases, the quantitative differences on our findings are small.
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4.2 Business cycle moments
First, the business cycle moments—standard deviations and correlations with output—are
reported in Panel A of Table 2.37 Six standard deviations in the table are a part of the set
of moments used to calibrate the model. Nonetheless, the remaining standard deviations—
of consumption, the short rate, and inflation—line up well with the data. The model also
correctly predicts positive correlations with output of consumption and the two types of
investment, with the correlation of consumption being the highest and the correlation of
housing investment being the lowest of the three. However, it overpredicts the strength of
these relations. This also applies to house prices. Such finding should be expected, as the
number of shocks in the model is limited. The short and long interest rates, the long-short
spread, and the inflation rate, nonetheless, have correlations with output similar to those in
the data.
The findings in Table 2 show that the cyclical properties of the model are not particularly
sensitive to whether FRM or ARM contract is used to simulate the model. This may seem
surprising as one would expect that, especially, the moments of housing investment should
be sensitive to the type of the loan. Housing investment is indeed less positively correlated
with output under ARM than FRM, and its volatility is lower under ARM than FRM, but
the differences are small. Is this true in the data? Panel B of the table shows that the
differences in the model are similar to those between a set of FRM countries and a set of
ARM countries.38 The reason for the similarity is that the TFP shock is the dominating
shock in the model and housing investment responds similarly to such a shock under both
contracts. However, as in the data, it responds a little less under ARM than FRM because
the responses are dampened by procyclical movements of interest rates, to which housing
investment is more sensitive under ARM than FRM, as shown below.
37The data are quarterly. Both the actual and simulated data are expressed as percentage (or percentage
point, for interest rates and the inflation rate) deviations from HP-filter trend.
38The countries used are the only countries for which quarterly housing investment data are available going
back to at least 1980. FRM counties: BEL, FRA, US; ARM countries: AUS, CAN, UK. The moments are
taken from Kydland et al. (2016).
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4.3 Responses to a real rate shock
Second, we scrutinize the model responses to the τbt shock, which directly affects the ex-
ante real interest rate. Recall that, in a reduced-form way, τbt captures various channels
through which primitive shocks affect the ex-ante real interest rate. The identification of
such shocks in the data, often associated with monetary policy surprises, is well understood.
Calza et al. (2013) employ a typical VAR identification strategy to study the responses of
housing investment in a sample of FRM and ARM countries. They find that, in response
to a one-percentage point (annualized) increase in the short-term nominal interest rate,
leading to an increase in the real rate, housing investment declines more in ARM than FRM
countries. Figure 3 shows that the model is consistent with this finding. Panel A shows
responses under the calibrated persistence of the τbt shock, panel B shows responses under
calibration that reproduces the persistence of the nominal interest rate following the VAR
shock in Calza et al. (2013). In the latter case, the quantitative response under FRM falls
within the error bands reported in their paper. Under ARM, the initial decline somewhat
exceeds their error bands (−1.95% in the model vs. −1.4% in their paper). This is likely
due to the fact that the interest rate of the ARM contract in the model adjusts immediately,
whereas in their study the classification of countries as ARM countries is based on interest
rates fixed for up to five years.
4.4 MPC of homeowners
Finally, in Table 3, we compare the MPC of ARM homeowners in the model with the
empirical MPC from the study by Di Maggio et al. (2014) described briefly in Section 1 (the
study does not contain MPC of FRM homeowners). In both the data and their study, the
MPC is calculated as an increase in consumption of ARM homeowners divided by the extra
income brought about by a decline in real mortgage payments occurring due to a drop in
the nominal interest rate. In the model, the nominal interest rate can decline due to both
the τbt and πt shocks (i.e., it can decline due to a decline in the real rate or in line with
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inflation), whereas the empirical study is silent on the sources of the decline. We therefore
consider both scenarios. As the empirical study is based on reduced form analysis, it does
not address the question of the agents’ expectations of the persistence of the interest rate
decline. When we use the calibrated persistence of the shocks, the model implies MPC of
around 0.28. However, a modest reduction in the persistence of the πt shock, from 0.994
to 0.95, replicates the empirical MPC of 0.17 (the MPC value of 0.28, however, is in the
ballpark of estimates from the fiscal stimulus literature, e.g., Johnson, Parker, and Souleles,
2006; Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland, 2013). As demonstrated below, reducing
the persistence of the shock to 0.95 does not change the main message of the paper. In the
case of the τbt shock, the persistence needs to be brought down to 0.7 to match the MPC of
0.17 (interestingly, a value in-between our calibrated value of 0.9 and the value implied by
Calza et al., 2013, of 0.5).
5 Findings: responses to the nominal shock
We start by reporting the responses of the model economy to the nominal shock under the
two contracts separately, abstracting from the choice between them and refinancing. This
exercise, while not strictly applicable to the United States, is relevant for other countries, in
addition to its purpose of isolating the effects of each contract. In many countries, ARMs (of
various types) are the only contract available; see footnote 1. And in some FRM countries
(Germany, France) refinancing is less common than in the United States; see Villar Burke
(2015). We then check the sensitivity of the basic findings to refinancing and mortgage
choice. While our model does not provide a full treatment of refinancing and mortgage
choice, it should give us a ballpark estimates of the effects of these decisions on the basic
findings.
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5.1 FRM vs. ARM
The quantitative assessment of the transmission mechanism under the two separate contracts
is contained in Figure 4. The figure plots the responses of selected variables to a positive
(1 percentage point, annualized) πt shock in period 1. The first two charts demonstrate the
nominal and level factor nature of the shock: the short-term nominal interest rate and the
inflation rate, and in the case of the FRM economy also the FRM rate, all increase more or
less in parallel by approximately one percentage point (annualized).39 The next chart plots
the responses of real mortgage payments (mt/pt). The chart confirms the effects discussed
in Section 2. Due to higher inflation, real mortgage payments decline on impact (period 1)
under both contracts by the same amount. But this decline is dwarfed by the magnitudes
in subsequent periods. Under FRM, real mortgage payments display a persistent gradual
decline, while under ARM the payments increase sharply (and persistently) one period after
the shock. Under FRM, both homeowners’ consumption (Ct) and housing investment (XSt)
increase in response to growing real disposable income (the figure plots responses of XSt but
the responses of XHt are similar). In contrast, under ARM, both variables decline in response
to the drop in real disposable income. Further, the responses under ARM are stronger than
under FRM. For instance, the decline in housing investment is 1.8% on impact under ARM,
compared with a 0.7% increase under FRM.40 House prices (pHt), not plotted due to space
constraints, increase on impact by 0.2% under FRM, and decline by 0.5% under ARM. The
last chart shows that capital owners’ consumption (C∗t ) responses are opposite to those of
homeowners, but are smaller and smoother. This reflects the fact that mortgage payments
are a quantitatively smaller fraction of capital owners’ than homeowners’ income (6.4% vs
24.2% of after-tax income) and that capital owners can better smooth out fluctuations in
income.
39The model is stationary. Thus, even though convergence back to steady state may not be apparent from
the plots, eventually all variables converge back to steady state. This, however, takes longer than the 40
periods displayed in the charts.
40The responses of consumption and housing investment do not exactly track the responses of real mortgage
payments as homeowners have (costly) access to the one-period bond market to smooth out the impact of
the changes in disposable income.
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5.1.1 Comparison with a real rate channel
It was argued in Section 2 that, under ARM, the effect of a one-for-one increase in the
nominal interest rate and inflation works like an increase in the real interest rate. How
does, then, the transmission mechanism under ARM quantitatively compare with a real
interest rate channel? To answer this question, we rely again on the τbt shock that affects
the ex-ante real interest rate. Using the calibration based on the VAR study of Calza et al.
(2013), ρb is set equal to 0.5. Figure 5 contains the results of this comparison. It plots the
responses of selected variables (it − Etπt+1, mt/pt, XS, and Ct) to a one percentage point
(annualized) increase in the short term nominal interest rate, occurring due to either the τbt
or the πt shock. Observe that under the τbt shock the ex-ante real interest rate (it −Etπt+1)
increases, whereas under the πt shock it stays almost unchanged (it gradually declines due
to small general equilibrium effects working through capital accumulation). The immediate
increase in real mortgage payments, however, is the same under the two shocks and the
subsequent effect is, in fact, more persistent under the πt shock than under the τbt shock.
Housing investment under both shocks declines by roughly 2% on impact, but the decline
is more persistent under the πt shock. The same applies to consumption. The transmission
mechanism studied in this paper is thus at least as potent, under ARM, as the traditional
real rate channel.
5.1.2 The role of persistence
The calibration of ρπ so far was based on replicating the persistence of the 10-year nominal
government bond yield, used as a proxy for the 30-year mortgage rate. How do the quanti-
tative findings change when the persistence of the shock is reduced? Figure 6 provides the
answer. Focusing on the ARM case, in which the real effects are generally larger, the initial
response of housing investment is reduced from 1.8% to 1.1% as the persistence is reduced
from the calibrated value of 0.994 to 0.95 (recall that the latter value is required to match
the MPC of homeowners in Di Maggio et al., 2014). When the persistence is further reduced
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to 0.5, the real effects become negligible. At this degree of persistence, the real effects work-
ing through the traditional real rate channel are much stronger (refer back to the bottom
panel of Figure 3). Notice that as the persistence is reduced, the πt shock starts to affect
the long-short spread, rather than the level of the yield curve. The transmission mechanism
proposed in this paper is thus quantitatively more relevant for monetary policy shocks that,
under expectations hypothesis, primarily affect the level of the yield curve, rather than its
slope.
5.2 Optimal refinancing
Does optimal refinancing make the responses of the economy under FRM look more like
under ARM when interest rates decline? Recall that the refi cost takes the form of a utility
loss χt in the homeowner’s utility function (4). To make the cost function operative, assume
a quadratic parametric form υ(̃t−Δ)2, with υ > 0. Under this assumption, the optimal refi
problem yields a simple solution with an intuitive interpretation, summarized by a first-order
condition for ̃t (see Appendix F in the supplementary material for details)







(Rt − iFt ). (29)
In equation (29), d̃t ≡ dt/pt−1 and VRt < 0 is the derivative of the homeowner’s value function
with respect to Rt, representing the marginal life-time gain of reducing the effective interest
rate on outstanding debt by one unit. By refinancing, the homeowner thus trades off the
current marginal refi cost against the expected marginal life-time benefit.
The parameter Δ is set equal to 0.02, which is the long-run average fraction of outstanding
debt that is refinanced per quarter. The parameter υ is set equal to 12, so as to match, in
equilibrium, the local elasticity of the share of refi loans in new loans with respect to the
FRM rate (see Appendix F for details). Figure 7 shows the responses of selected variables
to a 25 basis point quarterly (one percentage point, annualized) decline in the FRM rate,
occurring due to the πt shock, with the calibrated persistence of ρπ = 0.994. For comparison,
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the figure also plots responses under FRM without refinancing and under ARM. As expected,
the responses under refinancing lie in-between the other two cases. Quantitatively, they are
still closer to the FRM responses. This is because the increase in the quarterly refi share
of outstanding debt, ̃t, is fairly small: an increase from 0.02 to 0.026 on impact. Notice,
however, that (given the size of the stock) such a modest increase in t shows up as a
large increase in the refi share of new loans: an increase from 0.4 to 0.48 on impact. Due
to the attenuated response of real mortgage payments under refi, the negative responses
of consumption and housing investment observed under the basic FRM contract are now
weaker, close to zero, in fact, for several periods.
5.3 Optimal mortgage choice
Various studies document that the ARM share in the United States moves positively with
the long-short spread, or its various proxies (Koijen, Van Hemert, and Van Nieuwerburgh,
2007; Moench, Vickery, and Aragon, 2010; Badarinza et al., 2014). Is our model consistent
with this behavior once we allow for mortgage choice? And does mortgage choice affect the
responses of the model economy to the πt shock? As in the case of refinancing, the mortgage
choice cost function is made operative by assuming a quadratic form, Φ(.) = ω(l2t/lt − Λ)2,
where l2t/lt is the fraction of ARM loans in newly originated loans and Λ is a parameter
capturing the institutional norm of the ARM share in the economy. Optimal mortgage choice
is characterized by the first-order condition for l2t, which for the above cost function takes a
simple form
l2t/lt − Λ = vctpHtxHt
2ω
(τH1t − τH2t) , (30)
where τH1t and τH2t are the wedges capturing the price effect under FRM and ARM respec-
tively (see Appendix G in the supplementary material for details). The optimality condition
(30) thus states that the ARM share in new loans l2t/lt increases when the homeowner
perceives ARM loans as cheaper than FRM loans; i.e., τH1t > τH2t.
The parameter Λ is set equal to 0.3, the long-run average of ARM share in the U.S.
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economy, and the cost parameter ω is set so as to replicate the empirical elasticity of the
ARM share to the long-short spread, equal to 7.0 (i.e., a seven percentage point increase
in the ARM share in response to a one percentage point increase in the long-short spread).
This elasticity implies ω = 0.0055. Panel A of Figure 8 shows that the model is consistent
with the basic feature of the data: the ARM share of new loans declines when the long-short
spread declines. Given that the model is consistent with the basic observations on mortgage
choice in the data, we ask if mortgage choice plays an important role in the transmission
mechanism with respect to the πt shock. Panel B of Figure 8 provides a negative answer. As
the πt shock is highly persistent, it has almost no effect on the long-short spread and thus
no effect on mortgage choice. The response of housing investment is only affected by the
parameter Λ and lies in-between the responses under FRM and ARM, reported in Figure 4.
6 Concluding remarks
Mortgage payments constitute a substantial part of homeowners’ mandatory expenses. In
combination with the fact that mortgages are long-term loans set in nominal terms, it is
natural to ask: what role do mortgage contracts play in the transmission of monetary policy?
This paper attempts to establish these connections. Like goods market imperfections provide
a breeding ground for nominal price rigidities to play a role in the transmission of monetary
policy in New-Keynesian models, financial market imperfections (incomplete asset markets)
facilitate transmission of monetary policy through mortgage contracts in our framework.
Three key properties of the mortgage transmission mechanism emerge. First, the trans-
mission mechanism is found to be stronger under adjustable- than fixed-rate mortgages.
Second, monetary policy shocks affecting, under the expectations hypothesis, the level of the
nominal yield curve have larger real effects than transitory shocks affecting its slope. And
third, persistently higher inflation gradually benefits homeowners under FRMs, but hurts
them immediately under ARMs. In terms of quantities, on impact, housing investment in-
creases by 1.8% under ARM and declines by 0.7% (0.15% with refinancing) under FRM, in
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response to a one percentage point (annualized) downward shift of the nominal yield curve
(and inflation). Under ARM, the strength of the transmission mechanism is comparable to
a traditional real rate channel. This is despite the fact that, in equilibrium, the real interest
rate in our model hardly moves in response to monetary policy shocks.
In the interest of transparency, we have abstracted from the usual nominal frictions and
other channels through which housing finance affects the macroeconomy. The number of
shocks was also limited. A natural extension is therefore to incorporate these additional
features and study their interaction with the mechanism proposed here.
Another interesting avenue is to study the price and income effects in an overlapping
generations setup with realistic life-cycle dynamics. It is likely that the agents who face the
price effect are different from those who face the income effect. In addition, the importance
of the income effect is likely to vary with the homeownership life-cycle.
Finally, an important normative question regards optimal monetary policy. Such policy
is likely to depend on the prevalent mortgage type, FRM or ARM, in the economy. This
question is particularly complex for the Eurozone, which includes countries with very different
mortgage markets. Extending the model to allow for banks may also generate nontrivial
interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies.
The framework developed in this paper provides a groundwork that can be extended to
address these additional questions.
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Figure 1: Illustration of price and income effects. Debt-servicing costs over
a term of a new and an existing 30-year mortgage under alternative paths of
the short-term nominal interest rate. The label ‘steady-state’ refers to the
case when the short rate is at its steady-state level of 4%. The mortgage is
equal to four times the household’s annual income; the real interest rate is held
constant at 1% per annum.
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A. High persistence (0.99) of the short rate decline
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(120-period term) (119 periods remaining)
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B. Low persistence (0.5) of the short rate decline
New loan Existing loan
(120-period term) (119 periods remaining)
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Figure 2: Illustration of price and income effects. Debt-servicing costs un-






Ψ 2/3 Share of homeowners
Preferences
β 0.9883 Discount factor
ξ 0.5003 Weight on nonhousing consumption
Technology
ς 0.283 Capital share of output
δK 0.02225 Depreciation rate of capital
δH 0.01021 Depreciation rate of housing
ζ 3.0 Curvature of PPF
ϕ 0.1 Land share of new housing
Fiscal
G 0.138 Government expenditures
τN 0.235 Labor income tax rate
τK 0.3362 Capital income tax rate
τ 0.4693 Transfer
Mortgage contract
θ 0.6 Loan-to-value ratio
κ 0.00162 Initial amortization rate
α 0.9946 Amortization adjustment factor
Bond market
ϑ 0.0345 Participation cost function
Monetary policy rule
νπ 1.5 Weight on inflation
π 0.0113 Steady-state inflation rate
Exogenous processes
ρA 0.9641 Persistence of TFP shock
σA 0.0148 Std. of TFP innovations
ρπ 0.994 Persistence of nominal shock
σπ 0.0012 Std. of nominal innovations
ρb 0.903 Persistence of real rate shock
σb 0.00075 Std. of real rate innovations
ρq 0.798 Persistence of PPF shock
σq 0.012 Std. of PPF innovations
Refinancing
Δ 0.02 Long-run fraction of refi in outst. debt
υ 12.0 Cost function parameter
Mortgage choice
Λ 0.3 Long-run share of ARMs
ω 0.0055 Cost function parameter
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Table 2: Model cross-validation I: business cycle moments
A. U.S. data Model U.S. data Model
FRM ARM FRM ARM
Std Corr with Y
Y 1.92 1.90 1.91 Y 1.00 1.00 1.00
C 0.85 0.78 0.78 C 0.79 0.95 0.96
XS 13.32 12.98 12.77 XS 0.60 0.82 0.77
XK 4.70 5.09 5.58 XK 0.73 0.89 0.86
i 0.28 0.29 0.29 i 0.36 0.42 0.38
iF 0.17 0.18 N/A iF 0.01 0.16 N/A
iF − i 0.20 0.20 N/A iF − i -0.49 -0.43 N/A
π 0.34 0.23 0.22 π 0.36 0.36 0.33
pH 3.01 2.90 2.87 pH 0.55 0.96 0.91
B. Other countries Model
FRM ARM FRM ARM
std(XS)/ std(Y ) 5.80 5.50 std(XS)/ std(Y ) 6.83 6.68
corr(XS , Y ) 0.65 0.55 corr(XS , Y ) 0.84 0.77
Notes A: All moments are for HP-filtered series, quarterly data. U.S. data:
1958-2006. 10-year government bond yield is used as a proxy for iFt due to
longer time availability; CPI ex-energy inflation rate is used for πt; 3-month
T-bill yield is used for it; the ratio of the average price of new homes sold
(Census Bureau) and the GDP deflator is used for pHt (1975-2006). The
model moments are averages of moments for 150 runs; the artificial data of
each run are of the same length as the U.S. data and are also HP filtered.
Details of U.S. data are in Appendix C in the supplementary material.
Notes B: FRM countries are BEL, FRA, US; ARM countries are AUS, CAN,
UK. The moments, based on HP-filtered data, are taken from Kydland et al.
(2016). The classification is based on footnote 1.
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A. Calibrated shock persistence (ρb = 0.9)
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B. Shock persistence based on Calza et al. (2013) (ρb = 0.5)
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Figure 3: Model cross-validation II: a real rate shock. The effect of an increase of the ex-ante
real interest rate (τb shock). Panel A: calibrated shock persistence (ρb = 0.9) based on the
persistence of the long-short spread. Panel B: shock persistence (ρb = 0.5) chosen to replicate
the persistence of the response of the interest rate in Calza et al. (2013). Interest rates are
in percentage point deviations (annualized), housing investment is in percentage deviations.
One period = one quarter.
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Table 3: Model cross-validation III: marginal propensity to consume (MPC) of ARM home-
owners
Di Maggio et al. (2014) Calibrated Matched
Nom. shock Real rate shock Nom. shock Real rate shock
Shock persistence N/A 0.994 0.90 0.95 0.70
MPC 0.17∗ 0.29 0.27 0.17 0.17
Note: Real rate shock = direct effect on the ex-ante real interest rate (τb shock); nominal shock = no
direct effect on the ex-ante real interest rate (πt shock). Calibrated = persistence as in Table 1; matched =
persistence so as to reproduce MPC in Di Maggio et al. (2014).
∗ Based on their reported $150 increase in consumption in response to $900 increase in disposable income.
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Figure 4: Findings I: the transmission mechanism under separate contracts. Responses to the
nominal (πt) shock under FRM and ARM; no refinancing, no mortgage choice. Interest rates
and the inflation rate are measured as percentage point (annualized) deviations from steady
state, quantities are in percentage deviations. One period = one quarter.
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Figure 5: Findings II: comparison of two transmission mechanisms under ARM. Responses to
the real rate (τbt) shock and to the nominal (πt) shock under ARM. Real rate shock = circles.
Nominal shock = solid line. Interest rates are measured as percentage point (annualized)
deviations from steady state, quantities are in percentage deviations. The persistence of the
real rate shock is 0.5, based on the VAR estimate of Calza et al. (2013). The persistence of
the nominal shock is the calibrated value of 0.994, based on matching the autocorrelation of
the long rate. In both cases, the initial response of the short-term nominal interest rate (not
plotted) is one percentage point (annualized). One period = one quarter.
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A. ρπ = 0.994 B. ρπ = 0.95 C. ρπ = 0.5
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Figure 6: Findings III: the effect of the persistence of the nominal (πt) shock under FRM and
ARM; no refinancing, no mortgage choice. Interest rates and the inflation rate are measured
as percentage point (annualized) deviations from steady state, quantities are in percentage
deviations. One period = one quarter.
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Figure 7: Findings IV: the transmission mechanism under refinancing. Responses to a one
percentage point (annualized) decline in the FRM rate due to the nominal (πt) shock, with
the calibrated persistence ρπ = 0.994. Refi shares are measured as percentage point deviations
from steady state, quantities are in percentage deviations. One period = one quarter.
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A. Real rate shock, ρb = 0.9
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B. Nominal shock, ρπ = 0.994
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Figure 8: Findings V: the transmission mechanism under mortgage choice. Both shocks are
scaled so that, on impact, the short rate increases by one percentage point (annualized). ARM
share is measured as percentage point deviations from steady state, housing investment is in
percentage deviations. One period = one quarter.
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